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ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: NO LONGER
JUST A RECOMMENDATION
CHIEF ADMINISTRATiVE LAW JUDGE JULIAN MANN, III*
North Carolina's Administrative Procedure Act allows North
Carolina citizens who challenge agency action the opportunity to
adjudicate their claims before an independent administrative law
judge in the Office of Administrative Hearings. On January 1,
2001, extensive revisions to North Carolina's Administrative
Procedure Act became effective. This commentary furnishes a
historical context and an interpretative analysis of the recent
amendments.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2001, House Bill 968 became effective to provide
North Carolinians with a heightened administrative law due process
remedy.' The extensive revisions to North Carolina's Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) provide a more efficient and just remedy than
under the previous statutory scheme. The evolution of fifteen years
of APA legislative history culminated in the enactment of House Bill
968.
The predecessor APA, Chapter 150A,2 invested citizens with
extensive administrative and due process procedures, but with limited
* Chief Administrative Law Judge, Codifier of Rules, and Director of North
Carolina's Office of Administrative Hearings, now serving in his fourth term under
appointment of Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake Jr.
1. Act of July 12,2000, ch. 190, secs. 1 to 14,2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,546-52.
2. Act of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1331, sec. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691, 691-703 (current
version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B (1999 & Supp. 2000)) (existing from 1973 through
1985). The 1985 APA amendments repealed the predecessor APA (Chapter 150A),
which required an agency hearing officer to preside over contested cases. Act of July 12,
1985, ch. 746, see. 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 999 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150B (1999 & Supp. 2000)). The new APA (Chapter 150B) established the OAH's
independent adjudicatory authority as North Carolina's central panel. Id. See generally
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effectiveness because administrative hearings were tried before
agency hearing officers. In 1985, the General Assembly created the
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) under the concept of a
central panel, which is an independent adjudicatory tribunal.4 The
creation of the OAH severed adjudication from investigation and
prosecution to prevent the same person within an agency from
serving dual functions.5 The OAH provided a forum for independent
adjudication, but the revised APA did not grant the Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs) sufficient final authority to ensure remedial relief
because the ALJ's decision was only a recommendation to the
6agency. The ultimate relief rested with the agency's final decision
makers, who were charged with reviewing the ALl's recommended
decision. Cumulatively, these decision makers tended to reject
unfavorable recommendations and reinstate the agency's position in
the case In 2000, the General Assembly enhanced the authority of
Charles E. Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive
Analysis, 53 N.C. L. REV. 833 (1975) (discussing the scope, purpose, and background of
Chapter 150A).
3. Act of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1331, sec. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691, 698, amended by
Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, sec. 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 999 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150B (1999 & Supp. 2000)).
4. Id.; Julian Mann, III, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative Litigation: North
Carolina's Office of Administrative Hearings, 15 J. NAT'L ASS'N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES
151, 155 (1995). "[A] central panel is an autonomous, quasi-judicial, executive branch
agency composed of an independent cadre of administrative law judges who hear and
decide a wide range of administrative cases." Id. at 155. North Carolina was the
thirteenth jurisdiction to create a central panel in the United States. Id. There are more
than twenty-seven other jurisdictions in the United States operating under a central panel
system of administrative law. See John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A
Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 420 (2001). See generally Edwin L. Felter, Jr.,
Administrative Adjudication Total Quality Management: The Only Way to Reduce Costs
and Delays Without Sacrificing Due Process, 15 J. NAT'L ASS'N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5
(1995) (discussing the prevalence of central panels); John W. Hardwicke, The Central
Hearing Agency: Theory and Implementation in Maryland, 14 J. NAT'L ASS'N OF ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 5 (1994) (discussing, in addition to Maryland's central panel implementation,
the panels of states and the city of New York); Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings:
State Central Panels in the 1990's, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75 (1994) (discussing central panels
in Maryland and Texas and the future of state central panels).
5. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, sec. 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 1011 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (1999 & Supp. 2000)).
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch.
190, sec. 6, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546, 547 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 150B-34(a) (Supp. 2000)).
7. MARY SHUPING, N.C. GEN. ASSEM. RESEARCH DIv., CONTESTED CASES
UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE APA: BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OAH FINAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY, PRESENTED TO
THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 4
(Feb. 17,2000) (copy on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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the ALJs as independent adjudicators by increasing their decisional
authority and establishing strict standards for reviewing their initial
decisions.
The General Assembly amended section 7A-750,8 adding
expression to a previously implied purpose for the OAH.9 New
language was added referencing a citizen's right to due process
protection as required by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth"0 and
Fourteenth" Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well
as the Law of the Land Provision of the North Carolina
Constitution.1 2 The General Assembly emphasized this point with the
addition of the following language codified in section 7A-750:
The Office of Administrative Hearings is established to
ensure that administrative decisions are made in a fair and
impartial manner to protect the due process rights of citizens
who challenge administrative action and to provide a source
of independent administrative law judges to conduct
administrative hearings in contested cases in accordance
with Chapter 150B of the General Statutes and thereby
prevent the commingling of legislative, executive, and
judicial functions in the administrative process.
1 3
The General Assembly strengthened the due process remedy by
enacting amendments to sections 150B-34(a) and 150B-36(b). The
first amendment deleted the word "recommended" as a modifier in
reference to the decision issued by the ALJ.14  The second
amendment directed the agency final decision makers to adopt the
ALJ decision unless this decision was "clearly contrary to the
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (1999), amended by Act of July 12,2000, ch. 190, sec. 2,
2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,547 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (Supp. 2000)).
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. This provision is based on a similar provision in the
Magna Carta. MAGNA CARTA art. XXIX.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (Supp. 2000). See generally Bernard G. Segal, The
Administrative Law Judge, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424 (1976) (discussing the need for independent
ALJs); Edward A. Slavin, Jr., ALJ Independence Undermined, JUDGES J., Spring 1992, at
26 (discussing the intimidation of ALJs in the Interior Department by the Interior
Department).
14. Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, sec. 6, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546, 547 (current
version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (Supp. 2000)).
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preponderance of the ... evidence," significantly strengthening the
ALJ's decision to grant remedial relief.15
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECrIVE
The genesis of the right to an administrative hearing developed
as a result of the need for compliance with the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth 16 and Fourteenth 7 Amendments to the United States
Constitution. As articulated by three landmark United States
Supreme Court administrative law decisions: Goldberg v. Kelly, l"
Mathews v. Eldridge,9 and Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 0 due process requires a hearing prior to the taking of a
governmentally conferred property interest. These decisions granted
extensive remedial relief from state and federal bureaucratic action
through an expansive interpretation of the constitutional right to an
administrative hearing. 1 In response, North Carolina's General
Assembly enacted the APA,22  which included extensive
administrative law procedures, followed later by the formation of a
central panel with an independent forum for contested case hearings's
to protect petitioners' property interests from alleged wrongful
takings. Thus, the regulatory scheme is not just procedural, but
remedial in nature-ensuring that citizens receive adequate
constitutional protection from unauthorized takings of property
interests.24
Given this statutory formulation, the query became whether the
APA governed administrative procedures only or whether it
conferred upon petitioners a procedural right to a hearing for the
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b3) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
19. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
20. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
21. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 551; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349; Goldberg, 397
U.S. at 269-71; see Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267,
1268 (1975).
22. Act of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1331, sec. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 691, 691-703, amended
by Act of July 12,1985, ch. 746, sec. 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 987-1011 (current version
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B (1999 & Supp. 2000)).
23. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, sec. 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 1011 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (1999 & Supp. 2000)).
24. See, e.g., Scroggs v. N.C. Criminal Justice Educ. & Training Standards Comm'n,
101 N.C. App. 699, 701,400 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1991) (holding that a contested case hearing
must precede the termination of a property interest in a law enforcement certification); see
also Crump v. Bd. of Educ., 93 N.C. App. 168, 179, 378 S.E.2d 32, 38 (1989) (providing
that an unbiased, impartial decision maker is essential to due process).
[Vol. 791642
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abrogation of rights defined by the APA. A unanimous North
Carolina Supreme Court resolved this question in Empire Power Co.
v. N. C. Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources. 5
The court stated that North Carolina's APA offers a "person
aggrieved" a procedural right to a contested case hearing as long as
other statutes governing agency action do not exclude a citizen's
rights to a contested case hearing in order to guard against the
abrogation of a citizen's rights, duties or privileges.26
Standing to file for a contested case hearing is determined by
reference to the definition of "person aggrieved" in the APA.'7 This
definition requires that the petitioner's property interest be
substantially affected by an agency action.28  Once standing is
conferred upon the petitioner, remedial relief will follow under the
APA if the petitioner prevails in the litigation. Thus, the APA
confers both a procedural right to a hearing and remedial relief to the
successful litigant. Ultimately, the superior court, using the whole
record test for judicial review, must "determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to the relief sought in the petition."29  The
purpose of the contested case hearing is to determine the petitioner's
rights, duties or privileges.
30
Under the new APA amendments, the ALJ no longer
recommends a decision, but issues a decision of equal weight with
that of the final agency decision maker.31 Under the former APA
provision for the review of the AUJ decision,32 the agency reviewed
the official OAH's record to determine, under the law and facts,
whether the petitioner was entitled to a remedy.33 While the AL's
recommended decision might have been the starting point for the
final decision, the APA did not demand a serious consideration of the
25. 337 N.C. 569, 579, 447 S.E.2d 768, 774 (1994); see N.C. Supreme Court Clarifies
OAH Appeal Rights in Empire Power Co., ADMIN. LAW. (N.C. Bar Ass'n Admin. L.
Sec.), Feb. 1995, at 1.
26. Empire, 337 N.C. at 588,447 S.E.2d at 779 (rejecting the assertion that the organic
statute exclusively conferred standing to file a contested case).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(6) (1999).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 150B-51(c).
30. 1& § 150B-22.
31. See id. § 150B-34.
32. 1d& § 150B-36(a) to (b) (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, sec. 7,
2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546, 548 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(a) to (b)
(Supp. 2000)).
33. If the agency failed to make a final decision within the required time, however, the
agency was considered to have adopted the ALJ's recommended decision. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150B-44 (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, sec. 9, 2000 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 546,550 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-44 (Supp. 2000)).
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AL's recommended decision under any explicit standard of review.
The agency exercised considerable discretion in its use of AiU
decisions. The final agency decision maker was held only to a de
minimus standard of review if it did not accept the AL's
recommended decision; that is, the agency was limited only by the
requirement that it state specific reasons why it did not adopt the
recommended decision.34 After the agency issued its final decision,
the agency was required to send a copy of the decision to each of the
parties and to serve a copy upon the OAH 5
In enacting the recent amendments, the General Assembly
articulated a meaningful standard of review. This new provision
requires the agency to support in the record why the findings and
decision of the ALJ are contrary to the preponderance of the
evidence.36 Under the new amendments, each ALT finding not
specifically rejected by the final decision maker now becomes a
judicially determined fact in the agency's final decision and
subsequently on judicial review.37 An AIJ's findings of fact, once
given no judicial consideration,38 are now accorded conclusive effect if
not specifically rejected by the final decision maker.39
The amendments to section 150B-36 highlight the importance of
the AL's role as fact-finder. The ALT hears the evidence, observes
witness demeanor, writes a decision containing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and grants remedial relief subject to affirmation
by the superior court.40  An ALJ decision requires serious review
under very specific standards before the final decision maker may
reject it.41 Section 150B-36 as now written demonstrates the new
equality of the ALJ decision with that of the final decision.4 2
In 1991, the Legislative Research Commission, as part of a
broader study, first inquired into the issue of increasing the decisional
34. The agency is not required to refute point by point the ALl's findings and
conclusions. Webb v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Res., 102 N.C. App. 767,770,
404 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1991). Judicial interpretation of "specific reasons" never arose to a
standard of review. Id
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190,
sec. 7, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546, 548 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36 (b3)
(Supp. 2000)).
36. Id. § 150B-36(b3).
37. Id. § 150B-36(bl).
38. Id. § 150B-36(b), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, sec. 7, 2000 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 546,548 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36 (bl) (Supp. 2000)).
39. Id. § 150B-36(bl).
40. See id. § 150B-36.
41. Id. § 150B-36(b3).
42. Id. § 150B-36.
[Vol. 791644
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authority of the ALJs in the OAH.43 Presumably, the decisional
aspect of the legislative inquiry was based upon the inordinate length
of the APA bifurcated process between recommended and final
decision-making as well as a possible dissatisfaction with the agency's
tendency to reject the AL's recommended decision.' In 1991,
however, empirical data was unavailable to compare the historical
treatment of ALI decisions with those of the final agency decision
makers. As part of its primary charge, the Legislative Research
Commission recommended several revisions to the APA rulemaking
and hearings process, but made no attempt to modify the decisional
authority of the ALJs.45
Before the General Assembly proposed a decisional
modification to the APA process, it needed statistical information to
evaluate the dynamics of the interaction between the recommended
and final decision makers. Because section 150B-36 required the
agency to serve the OAH with a copy of all final decisions, a
convenient source of information existed to make this statistical
comparison between the AIJs' recommended decisions and the final
agencies' decisions.46 The OAH began collecting this data prior to
1990.11 Subsequent analysis of this data yielded unsettling results.
Comparative statistics demonstrated that state agencies prevailed
against the citizen/petitioner in approximately seventy-five percent of
the petitions that reached hearing at the OAH.48 Conversely, twenty-
five percent of the hearings were decided in favor of the
citizen/petitioner. 4 Overwhelmingly, the final decision maker upheld
the ALJ when the A_'s recommended decision was favorable to the
initial agency.50 This statistical analysis depicted a skewed system
43. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
REPORT TO THE 1991 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1991 Sess., at 3
(1991).
44. SHUPING, supra note 7, at 4.
45. Id.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190,
sec. 7, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546, 548 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36 (b3)
(Supp. 2000)).
47. At various times, this data was provided to the North Carolina Bar Association,
various legislative committees, the Government Performance Audit Committee (GPAC),
and later to the newly established General Assembly APA Oversight Committee. The
question that arose was whether it was necessary to give the average citizen a more
meaningful remedy under the APA. Despite this query, no major APA legislative
initiatives were proposed.
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favoring agency outcomes.5 1 Confronted with these statistics, certain
legislators became concerned that the playing field was not level for
both sides.5 2 Suggestions for reform centered on the following two
primary objectives: first, to find a solution to the inherent delay in
the bifurcated system of administrative decision-making, and second,
to put in place a meaningful standard of review between the ALT and
the final decision maker, with a more neutral initial appellate review
of the final decision in the superior court.
Several legislative initiatives were introduced between 1992 and
1999, demonstrating the General Assembly's willingness to address
the two primary objectives. In the 1997 Session of the General
Assembly, Senator Fletcher Hartsel5 3 on the Senate floor offered an
amendment to the Clean Water Responsibility Act (House Bill 515).14
This amendment, known as the Hartsell Amendment, reflected
almost exactly the legislation that Senator William Martin55 earlier
devised based upon the 1992 Government Performance Audit
Committee's (GPAC) study recommendations for the OAH.5 6
Although Senator Martin's efforts to modify the OAH system
achieved little success, frustrated by the adamant opposition of
agency representatives, his efforts nevertheless reflected the GPAC's
position that the OAH should issue a final decision. The GPAC's
recommendations were based as much on an effort to reduce the
steps in the administrative process as a cost-saving measure than on a
drive to provide meaningful APA reform. 7 Senator Hartsell seized
upon the concept of a final OAH decision in his efforts to reform the
APA process, but with a slant toward promoting fairness rather than
efficiency. Yet, his measure did not grant final decision-making
authority to the OAH, but instead mirrored the compromise
fashioned by Senator Martin to bind the final decision maker to the
AL's findings." The Hartsell Amendment made the ALJ's findings
51. Id
52. Wanted: Leadership, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, June 17, 1999, at 12A (noting that
Representatives Martin Nesbitt, D-Buncombe, and Connie Wilson, R-Mecklenburg,
voiced "concerno that those who appeal contested cases under the current Administrative
Law Judge system usually lose").
53. Senator Hartsell is a Republican from Cabarrus County representing District 22.
54. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1st Sess. 892, 892 (1997).
55. Senator Martin is a Democrat from Guilford County representing District 31.
56. N.C. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AUDIT COMMITTEE, OUR STATE, OUR
FUTURE 102 (1992) (summarizing a legislatively commissioned performance audit of all
state agencies conducted by KPMG Peat Marwick, Washington, D.C.).
57. See id.
58. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1646 [Vol. 79
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of fact and conclusions of law binding upon the final agency decision
maker if the ALl's findings and conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence in the record.5 9 This standard was identical to
the standard found in Article Four of Chapter 150B that provided for
the review of the final decision by the superior court.6° Although
House Bill 515 passed in the Senate,61 its provisions relating to the
APA were omitted in the House of Representatives.6 2
By omitting the Hartsell Amendment from the Clean Water
Responsibility Act, Senate reformers believed that the House of
Representatives was reluctant to change the APA system, preferring
instead to maintain the status quo, and that no APA reform would
occur without a change in philosophy in the House of
Representatives. Between the 1997 and 1999 Sessions, the House
leadership moved from Republican to Democratic Party control.63
With this change, there appeared to be a more receptive environment
for APA reform. Representatives Connie Wilson" and Martin
Nesbitt65 took up the cause in the House Chamber.' Representative
Nesbitt had a long history with APA issues, dating back to the
creation of the OAH in 1985.67 Representative Wilson, a newcomer
to APA issues, thought the process was unfair to the
citizen/petitioner. 68 Their positions were supported by an array of
private organizations that supported APA reform and many members
of the General Assembly APA Oversight Committee.69 The language
1st Sess. 125, 125 (1993).
59. See id.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(5) (1999).
61. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1st Sess. 892, 893 (1997).
62. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1st Sess. 1703, 1703-04 (1997).
63. Wade Rawlins, GOP Loses Prized Majority, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Nov. 4, 1998, at Al.
64. Representative Wilson is a Republican from Mecklenburg County representing
District 57.
65. Representative Nesbitt is a Democrat from Buncombe County representing
District 51.
66. See Wanted. Leadership, supra note 52.
67. For a discussion of the background and legislative history of the 1985 legislation,
see John Sanders, Administrative Procedure, in NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1985
(Robert P. Joyce ed., 1985).
68. See Wanted: Leadership, supra note 52.
69. Some individuals and organizations instrumental in implementing the
amendments included Charles D. Case on behalf of a number of associations and business
interests, Mike Carpenter of the North Carolina Home Builders Association, Dick Taylor
of the North Carolina Trial Lawyers Association, Bill Rowe and Elizabeth McLaughlin of
the North Carolina Community Development and Justice Center, Bob Slocum of the
2001] 1647
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of the original version of House Bill 968 modeled the language of the
Hartsell Amendment, which had previously failed concurrence in the
House.7° Several other influential House members signed on to
House Bill 968 as sponsors and the bill was introduced in the House
of Representatives in the 1999 Session of the General Assembly.71 To
most observers' surprise, House Bill 968 quickly won committee
approval,72 was immediately calendared for House floor debate, and
ultimately passed the House by a substantial margin in the face of
what amounted to little organized opposition.73 However, once the
House enacted House Bill 968, it then passed over to the Senate,
where rapid agency and executive branch opposition postponed
consideration of the measure until the 2000 Short Session. Prior to
adjournment, House Bill 968 had been assigned to the Senate
Judiciary II Committee.74 Between sessions, Senator Brad Miller,
committee chair, inherited the daunting task of bringing a consensus
bill to the Judiciary Committee and later to the Senate floor. He met
extensively with interested representatives from all perspectives and
solicited written comments from recipients of a widely distributed
survey.75 By allowing all interested persons to voice their concerns
personally to him, Senator Miller, with the constant input of
Representative Nesbitt and other representatives, skillfully drafted
consensus changes to House Bill 968 to reflect agency and executive
concerns. Ultimately, Senator Miller fashioned a compromise that
expanded the authority of the superior court.76
The Senate version of House Bill 968 was a retreat from both the
House version and the Hartsell Amendment with their significant
deference to the OAH's recommended decision. The Senate bill
North Carolina Forestry Association, Curtis Venable, a public interest attorney, Leslie
Bevacqua of the North Carolina Chemical Council, Natalie English of the Charlotte
Chamber of Commerce, and Christie Barbee of the Carolina Pavement Association.
70. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1st Sess. 1703, 1703-04 (1999).
71. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1st Sess. 430,430 (1999).
72. Id. at 588.
73. Id. at 679.
74. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1st Sess. 542, 542 (1999) (stating that H.B. 968 was reassigned to the Judiciary II
Committee).
75. See Letter from Charles E. Daye, Henry Brandis Professor of Law, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law, to Senator Brad Miller, North Carolina
General Assembly (May 3, 2000) (responding to Senator Miller's letter requesting
comments on House Bill 968) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
76. Legislative staff attorney, Karen Cochrane-Brown, drafted nineteen versions of
H.B. 968 before reaching a consensus bill.
1648 [Vol. 79
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moved instead to a very detailed standard of review, preserving the
agency's power to write its own decision, but requiring extensive
analytical review of the AUJ decision before it could be rejected.
This concept is presently embodied in the enacted legislation.77 Upon
presentation of this compromise bill, the Senate responded again with
a unanimous vote ratifying the Senate substitute for House Bill 968
with the active support of President Pro Tempore Marc Basnight and
his legislative staff.78  It was then returned to the House for
concurrence. A late-hour effort by stalwarts to defeat concurrence
was mounted in the House, but due to the broad consensus, including
the Governor's approval, and the skillful compromise fashioned in
the Senate, Representatives Nesbitt and Wilson managed a
sometimes rancorous floor debate to achieve House concurrence in
the Senate amendments.79 Their bill ultimately won final approval
with only eleven dissenting votes.80
II. PROCEDURES UNDER THE NEW APA
North Carolina has an exclusively petition-generated central
panel.81 The Rules of Civil Procedure and the General Rules of
Practice for Superior and District Courts have been adopted and
applied to the contested cases heard in the OAH.2 The Rules of
Evidence generally apply to proceedings before the central panel
except as limited by section 150B-29. 3 Section 150B-36(c) provides
that certain decisions by the ALJs are final decisions-mostly those
based on prehearing motions such as jurisdictional motions, failure to
prosecute, and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.84 Previously, motions based upon judgment on the pleadings
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b) (Supp. 2000).
78. General Counsel Norma Mills of Senator Basnight's staff was the principal
advocate.
79. Representatives Dan Blue, Billy Creech, Sam Ellis, and David Redwine were
instrumental in convincing the House membership to concur.
80. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
2nd Sess. 543,543 (2000).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-23(a) (1999) (stating that a contested hearing is
"commenced by filing a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings").
82. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 26, r. 3.0101(1) (June 2000). For a discussion of the
expanded attorney fee provisions in H.B. 968, see Charles D. Case, 2001: The
Administrative Procedures Act, 111-9 (Nov. 14,2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-29(a) (Supp. 2000). This section liberalizes the standards
for admissibility of reliable evidence. Id. For example, "when evidence is not reasonably
available under the rules to show relevant facts, then the most reliable and substantial
evidence shall be admitted." Id.
84. Id. § 150B-36(c).
16492001]
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and summary judgment were treated as modified recommended
decisions.11 Under a new subsection enacted in section 150B-36(d),
ALJs may now grant judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) or
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 that dispose of all the issues
in the contested case. 6 The agency now reviews these orders under
its new authority and is given the opportunity to make a final
decision." However, the aggrieved person may elect to appeal
immediately to the superior court for judicial review.8
Under the provisions of the new APA amendments in section
150B-29(a), the party with the burden of proof in a contested case
must establish the facts required by section 150B-23(a) by a
preponderance of the evidence. 9 No prior APA statutory section had
referenced or established the burden of proof in a contested case.
Courts, however, addressed the issue:
In the absence of a valid statute or regulation establishing
the standard of proof, G.S. § 150B-29 requires that "the
rules of evidence as applied in the trial division of the
General Court of Justice shall be followed." Our Supreme
Court has stated that the standard of proof in administrative
matters is by the greater weight of the evidence .... 90
Occasionally, the substantial evidence test-an appellate
standard-was misinterpreted to be the trial standard burden of proof
to be applied in the administrative hearing. Because the old APA
standard located in section 150B-36(b) required the final decision
maker to support its decision by substantial evidence, some advocates
erroneously perceived this test as the appropriate burden at the
contested case hearing. Substantial evidence was actually defined in
the APA in section 150B-2(8b). 91 Consequently, the burden of proof
85. Id. § 150B-36(c), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, sec. 7, 2000 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 546,549 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(c) (Supp. 2000)).
86. Id. § 150B-36(d).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 150B-29(a).
90. Dillingham v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 132 N.C. App. 704, 711-12, 513 S.E.2d
823, 828 (1999) (citing In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 603, 189 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1972)); see
also Brooks v. Austin Berryhill Fabricators, Inc., 102 N.C. App. 212, 219, 401 S.E.2d 795,
800 (1991) (holding that the greater weight of the evidence is the standard of proof in an
administrative hearing and noting that "proof by preponderance of the evidence and proof
by the greater weight of the evidence are synonymous burdens of proof').
91. "'Substantial Evidence' means relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(8b) (1999).
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in an administrative cause of action is now unmistakably the same as
the burden of proof in a civil cause of action. 2
Another significant APA change addresses agency expertise at
the contested case hearing. Although no prior APA section
specifically referenced agency expertise (other than section 150B-30),
several appellate decisions afforded some deference to agency
expertise.93 In the 2000 amendments to the APA, section 150B-34(a)
links the newly enunciated burden of proof with another new
requirement that the presiding ALJ give "due regard to the
demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency with respect to
facts and inferences within the specialized knowledge of the
agency." 94  This section, however, is silent as to the means of
reflecting due regard in the record.
One means traditionally available to the parties to establish
agency expertise and official notice is found in the provisions of
section 150B-30.
95
Official notice may be taken of all facts of which judicial
notice may be taken and of other facts within the specialized
knowledge of the agency. The noticed fact and its source
shall be stated and made known to affected parties at the
earliest practicable time, and any party shall on timely
request be afforded an opportunity to dispute the noticed
fact through submission of evidence and argument.96
Official notice in administrative litigation is the counterpart of
judicial notice in civil and criminal litigation with very little, if any,
distinction between the tWo. 97 For years, this under-utilized section
has been available to administrative litigants.98 The party with the
92. Under the new APA, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence, a
standard far greater than the substantial evidence test. ld. § 150B-29(a) (Supp. 2000).
93. See, e.g., Darryl Burke Chevrolet, Inc. v. Aikens, 131 N.C. App. 31,36, 505 S.E.2d
581,584 (1998) (stating that "[a]gency rulings and interpretations are not controlling upon
the courts, but 'do constitute "a body of experience and informed judgment" which have
been "given considerable and in some cases decisive weight."' ... ) (citing Schultz v. W.R.
Hartin & Son, Inc., 428 F.2d 186,191 (4th Cir. 1970) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a).
95. Id. § 150B-30.
96. IM
97. See icL (stating that official notice may be taken whenever judicial notice may be
taken); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 15.01-15.10 (3d
ed. 1972).
98. DAVIS, supra note 97, at § 15.10. It is the opinion and experience of the author
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burden of proof may request the presiding ALJ to take official notice
of agency expertise. This ruling, however, is ultimately
discretionary.99 If the AL should decline to take official notice, then
other options are available to the party with the burden of proof,
although none are explicitly stated in the statute.
Just how is the agency to demonstrate"° knowledge and expertise
with respect to facts and inferences? Specialized knowledge must be
demonstrated. 1 1  For example, agency expertise could be
"demonstrated" through the testimony of an expert witness. Expert
witnesses often appear in contested case hearings and offer a broad
range of opinions to assist the trier of fact. Agency professionals who
possess specialized knowledge could testify by opinion to establish
the agency's specialized knowledge. Once the expert is qualified and
the opinion admitted into evidence, the ALJ must give "due regard"
to this knowledge and expertise with respect to findings of fact and
the inferences derived therefrom.1"
Alternatively, an agency's expertise could theoretically be
established by rulemaking.10 3 An agency standard interpreting a
statutory delegation (including a congressional enactment or a federal
regulation) could be adopted by the agency through rulemaking and
offered as authority at the contested case hearing to demonstrate
agency expertise in a given subject matter.1°4
If official notice is taken of agency expertise, if testimony is
offered by an agency expert witness, or if agency rulemaking
establishes agency expertise, then the ALT must give "due regard"'10 5
when interpreting the evidence, making a finding of fact, and
that trial attorneys rarely seek to establish facts by judicial or official notice, particularly as
to the specialized knowledge of the agency. Id.
99. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACrICE § 5.55 (2d
ed. 1997).
100. Demonstrate is defined as "prov[ing] or mak[ing] evident by reasoning or
adducing evidence." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 380 (2d ed. 1982).
101. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (Supp. 2000).
102. Id
103. The North Carolina General Statutes defines a rule as "any agency regulation,
standard, or statement of general applicability that implements or interprets an enactment
of the General Assembly." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(8a) (1999) (emphasis added); see
also United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2167 (2001) (recognizing that "[a] very
good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment is express congressional
authorizations to engage in the [process of] rulemaking ... for which deference is
claimed").
104. Mead, 121 S. Ct. at 2167. But by definition it must be limited to a statement of
general applicability and not promulgated for application to the facts of a specific
contested case.
105. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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considering inferences that follow from the demonstrated agency
expertise. Given that the preponderance of evidence standard now
clearly controls in the administrative hearing, close factual cases could
turn on the necessity of giving "due regard" to these expert findings
and inferences in the decision of the ALl. In short, the scales could
be tipped in favor of expertise.
One additional note on these evidentiary changes is reflected in
what is required by the agency in reaching its final decision after
review of the decision of the AL. Of particular importance is the
requirement that the agency examine the credibility findings made by
the ALJ at the contested case hearing."° Although the decisional
authority remains bifurcated, there is but one fact-finding hearing of
record when witness demeanor may be directly observed.107 The
agency's decision is based upon the review of the record, as is each of
the steps of appellate review thereafter."0 ' Under the new APA
provisions, agency fact finders are still permitted to make credibility
findings. 109 However, the agency must give "due regard" to the
opportunity of the ALJ to evaluate the credibility of the witness.110
"Due regard" is a new term of art that was presumably employed
in lieu of the term "deference." Deference is a term of art that has a
long-standing history of judicial construction in both state and federal
appellate decisions."' However, "due regard" has no such history of
judicial construction in the administrative law setting and logically
would be interpreted as something less than deference.' It is neither
required that the ALJ defer to the agency expertise, nor is it required
that the agency defer to the credibility findings of the ALJ."
Nevertheless, the General Assembly seems to be balancing the
specialized fact-finding expertise of the ALJ with the subject matter
expertise of the agency. In the event that the decision of the ALTJ is
not adopted by the agency, the superior court judge, in the first tier of
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(bl) (Supp. 2000) (stating that a fact is deemed
acceptable if not specifically rejected by the agency).
107. Id. § 150B-36(b).
108. Id.; Jarrett v. N.C. Dep't of Cultural Res., 101 N.C. App. 475, 479, 400 S.E. 2d 66,
69 (1991) (holding that the court shall consider the "whole record" when reviewing agency
decisions).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (Supp. 2000).
110. Id.
111. "Deference" arose primarily from the landmark Supreme Court decision in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984).
112. Black's Law Dictionary defines "due regard" as "[c]onsideration in a degree
appropriate to demands of the particular case." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 501 (6th ed.
1990).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (Supp. 2000).
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appellate review, is not required to give deference to either the
agency or the ALl's decision." 4 The superior court is free to adopt
either of the prior decisions, remand the case, reverse the final
decision, or prepare a neutral decision based upon the record.115
One additional efficiency measure was enacted in section 150B-
44, in which the agency is required to reduce by thirty days the time
for consideration of the OAH official record from ninety" 6 to sixty
days."7 In spite of this diminution, the agency may grant itself one
additional extension of time."18  Therefore, if an agency takes
advantage of both its original time of review and the extension, the
period is shortened by sixty days, from a total of 180 days under the
old law" 9 to 120 days under the new law.
CONCLUSION
Despite the amendments discussed herein, there should be little
noticeable change to the procedures governing the trial of contested
cases in the OAH. When the agency adopts the ALJ decision, there
is very little change in the appellate review standards, which remain
based primarily upon the substantial evidence test and de novo review
of conclusions of law.12 ' The major reforms in the new APA revisions
are illustrated in the new standards of review, which require the
agency to give close and careful consideration to the findings and
remedial relief contained in the ALJ decision when the agency fails to
adopt the ALJ decision. 22 The superior court is free to adopt either
of the prior decisions or essentially write the superior court's own
decision based upon a review of the official record.'23 In this
situation, the superior court judge is not required to give deference to
114. Id. § 150B-51(c).
115. It
116. Id § 150B-44 (1999), amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, sec. 9, 2000 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,550 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-44 (Supp. 2000)).
117. It § 150B-44.
118. Id
119. Id. § 150B-44, amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, sec. 9, 2000 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 546,550 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OB-44 (Supp. 2000)).
120. It § 150B-44.
121. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b) (1999), amended by Act of July 12,2000,
ch. 190, sec. 11, 2000 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 546,551 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-
51 (b) (Supp. 2000)) (providing that the superior court may reverse or modify the agency's
decision if the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence and the petitioner's rights
have been prejudiced), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b) (Supp. 2000) (making the
substantial evidence review standard applicable to judicial review only in the circumstance
of agreement between ATJ and agency decisions).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(b) (Supp. 2000).
123. Id § 150B-51(c).
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either the agency expertise or the credibility findings of the AL. 2
This is a substantial departure from previous statutory law,
lz5 and will
alter long established appellate case law governing the standard of
review of the superior court decision in the context of judicial review
when the agency did not adopt the ALJ decision. 6 However,
appellate review of all APA decisions will remain subject to de novo
review for questions of law without modification of prior case law. 27
What do all of these statutory changes hold for the future of
contested case hearings in the OAH? One result could be that
contested cases that are weaker or more difficult to prove may be
compromised, settled, or dismissed prior to the contested case
hearing because after the OAH hearing the final decision maker is
tightly bound to the ALT decision with only narrow authority to
modify this decision. If this prediction holds true, then the OAH
should see a slight reduction in some types of contested case filings.
Otherwise, there should be very little impact in the hearings process
before the OAH. The major APA reform will come after the OAH
evidentiary hearings, with the review of the AL's decision by the
agency and the subsequent review of that decision in the superior and
appellate courts. Ultimately, the citizen/petitioner will be accorded a
heightened due process remedy under the decisions rendered by the
AIJ as the trier of fact.
The trend of agency decision makers to adopt favorable ALJ
decisions should continue under the new APA amendments. The
high rate of agency reversals should diminish when the citizen
petitioner prevails, because the ALT decision can no longer be easily
cast aside. Strict standards of review are now in place, which require
agency decision makers to adopt ALU decisions unless the record
shows that this decision is clearly contrary to the preponderance of
the evidence. Where prior law permitted no consideration of the AUJ
decision on judicial review, now the superior court judge may
124. Id. The court is charged with examining the agency's procedural review of the
ALJ decision. Id § 150B-51(a).
125. Id § 150B-51, amended by Act of July 12, 2000, ch. 190, sec. 11, 2000 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 546,551 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51 (Supp. 2000)).
126. See, e.g., Meads v. N.C. Dep't of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 663, 509 S.E.2d 165, 170
(1998); Wilkie v. N.C. Wildlife Res. Comm'n, 118 N.C. App. 475, 482-83, 455 S.E.2d 871,
876 (1995).
127. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Bruton, No. COAO0-743, slip op. at 2
(N.C. App., July 17,2001); Hedgepeth v. N.C. Div. of Servs. for the Blind, 142 N.C. App.
338, 346, 543 S.E.2d 169, 176 (2001); Sutton v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 132 N.C. App. 387,
388-89, 511 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1999); Amanini v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 114 N.C. App.
668, 678, 443 S.E.2d 114, 120 (1994).
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consider fully and adopt the AL decision. Gone is the judicially
required deference given to a final decision maker when that decision
maker summarily reverses an ALT who has granted remedial relief to
a citizen at trial in the OAH. Thus, administrative justice for the
prevailing North Carolina citizen is no longer just a recommendation.
